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We derive the optimal contract between a principal and a liquidity-constrained agent in a 
stochastically repeated environment. The contract comprises a court-enforceable explicit 
bonus rule and an implicit fixed salary promise that must be self-enforcing. Since the agent’s 
rent increases with bonus pay, the principal implements the maximum credible salary 
promise. Thus, the bonus increases while the salary promise and the agent’s effort decrease 
with a higher probability of premature contract termination. We subject this mechanism to 
econometric testing using personnel data of an insurance company. The empirical results 
strongly support our theoretical predictions. 
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We examine a contracting problem in a stochastically repeated environment
between a risk-neutral principal and an agent that is risk-neutral but liquidity
constrained. The agent￿ s e⁄ort is assumed observable albeit not contractible.
In such an environment, the incentive scheme may comprise two parts. Con-
tingent on the realization of a veri￿able - i. e. court-enforceable - monitoring
signal, the principal can o⁄er an explicit bonus. In addition, he can condi-
tion a salary promise on the observation that the agent￿ s e⁄ort satis￿es an
implicitly agreed threshold level. Since the agent￿ s e⁄ort cannot be veri￿ed
by third parties, this promise must be self-enforceable.
The explicit bonus allows the agent to extract rent while the implicit
salary promise does not. Thus, the principal can reduce the agent￿ s rent by
substituting explicit for implicit incentives. However, the self-enforcement re-
quirement may impose an upper limit on the credible salary promise. In this
case, the probability that the principal-agent relationship ends prematurely
generates a trade-o⁄ between implicit and explicit incentives. Speci￿cally,
the bonus increases and the salary promise decreases with a higher probabil-
ity of premature contract termination. At the same time, the agent￿ s e⁄ort
and, hence, productivity decreases.
We test the prediction of our model using personnel data from a large
German insurance company. The dataset contains detailed information on
individual revenues, compensation, and other characteristics for more than
300 employees over the course of ￿ve years. First, we estimate the expected
survival time of an employee within the ￿rm. Second, we proxy expected
contracted duration by the mean expected survival time when estimating
a simultaneous equations model. As predicted by our theoretical model,
longer expected contract duration increases the ￿xed salary and productivity
while decreasing variable pay. Third, we show that the productivity e⁄ect of
expected contract duration is con￿ned to the induced trade-o⁄between ￿xed
and variable pay.
1The standard, one-period principal-agent model is often considered to be
the building block of incentive theory.1 Although, Foster and Rosenzweig
(1994) and Lazear (2000) successfully test its implications within work envi-
ronments that rather perfectly ￿t the model assumptions,2 it is fair to say
that empirical evidence is still ￿tenuous.￿ 3 For instance, Jensen and Murphy
(1990) ￿nd that executive contracts lack strong performance-pay incentives.
More recently, Freeman and Kleiner (2005) show that, due to monitoring and
transaction costs, a piece rate system may increase labor productivity but not
pro￿ts. Moreover, the announcement of future time rates increases produc-
tivity by twice the percentage realized when introducing piece-rates. Finally,
a series of very well-crafted studies by Prendergast (1999, 2000, 2002a, 2002b)
concludes that incentive intensities do not decrease with more uncertainty as
predicted by the standard model.
Explanations of these ￿ndings typically rely on additional assumptions
regarding the contracting environment. For example, Jensen and Murphy
(1990) suggest that political forces both in the public sector and inside the
organizations place limits on incentives for CEOs. According to Prender-
gast (2002a), private information becomes more valuable - and, thus, the
moral hazard problem more acute - if the environment becomes more risky.
Prendergast (2002b) adds that favoritism of supervisors can lead to lower
incentive-intensities in less risky environments.
More radical, experimental economics suggests that agents are intrinsi-
cally motivated or supply e⁄ort as part of a gift exchange.4 BØnabou and
Tirole (2006) then show that, with stronger monetary incentives, the agent
increasingly doubts that supplying e⁄ort constitutes a ￿good deed.￿ Con-
sequently, such extrinsic incentives crowd out her intrinsic motivation. Al-
ternatively, according to Sliwka (2007), stronger monetary incentives convey
that the principal becomes more pessimistic about the agents￿acceptance
of an e⁄ort norm. Thus, by introducing high-powered incentives the ￿con-
1See Lazear and Oyer (2007), for instance.
2Prendergast (1999).
3Prendergast (2002a).
4See e. g. Fehr et al. (2007) and Hannan et al. (2002) respectively.
2formists￿in the labor force - i. e. individuals who only accept the norm if
su¢ ciently many others do as well - are led to reduce their e⁄ort.
Compared to these studies, our approach is more traditional. We follow
Baker et al. (1994) and Pearce and Stacchetti (1998) who already ana-
lyze the interplay between implicit and explicit incentives that arises with
the availability of both objective and subjective performance signals in the
context of a repeated game. These studies primarily focus on the distri-
butional e⁄ects of distorted or biased signals on the agent￿ s risk-premium.
MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) and Levin￿ s (2003) extend the results from
repeated agency model distinguishing between common and private perfor-
mance monitoring. With risk-neutral principal and agent, court-enforceable
performance pay and self-enforcing income promises are shown to constitute
perfect substitutes.
In contrast, we ￿nd that implicit salary promises always dominate if the
agent is liquidity-constrained and not all promises are credible. Speci￿cally,
if credibility constrains the salary promise, the contract comprises additional
explicit performance pay. In this case, the agent captures a rent and her
e⁄ort is only second-best. Our model is very tractable and yields testable
implications concerning the trade-o⁄s between the two incentive devices and
the determinants of e⁄ort. To our knowledge, so far only Hayes and Schaefer
(2000) investigate implicit contracts empirically. They show that the unex-
plained variation in current CEO-compensation is positively correlated with
future ￿rm performance.5
The dataset we use contains employees who coordinate the sales force
of a large and long-established German insurance company. Using actual
personnel data, we observe individual productivities, salaries, variable pay,
and many other characteristics of the employees￿tasks, career status, and
job environment. We track employees from January 2003 until December
2007. Thus, the dataset comprises 1123 employee-year observations for 317
5Else, the existing evidence is rather circumstantial: for instance, Rayton (2003) reports
that, although contracts lack explicit incentives based on ￿rm performance, rank-and-￿le
employees￿incomes exhibit considerable performance sensitivities.
3individuals. Since average employee tenure is longer than 10 years, this data
appears particularly well-suited to study reputational contracting.
Eisner and Strotz (1961) already remark that insurance contracts are
￿sold rather than bought￿ . Insurance companies should therefore be very ex-
perienced in designing incentive contracts. In fact, performance pay consti-
tutes a signi￿cant cost factor in this industry: in 2004, for instance, German
life insurers paid out 10:2% of their gross premium revenue as commissions
to their sales organizations.6 However, empirical research is mostly con￿ned
to analyses of distribution channels.7 Recently, only Cummins and Doherty
(2006) focus on contract design when discussing the New York Attorney
General￿ s 2005 investigation into the possible adverse e⁄ects of contingent
commissions.
Our contribution is therefore threefold: ￿rst, we provide a theoretical
variation to analyze the interplay of explicit and implicit incentives. Second,
we can rather directly test this particular mechanism using personnel data.
Third, focussing on rank-and-￿le employees of an insurance company, we also
provide new insights into the ￿real-world￿design of incentive contracts.
The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretic model.
Section 3 introduces the dataset and contains the econometric investigation.
Section 4 concludes.
6BaFin (2005). For the American property and casualty market Cummins and Doherty
(2006) report that commissions for personal lines (commercial lines) amount to 9.7 % (11.4
%) of gross premiums written.
7See the survey by Regan and Tennyson (2000).
42 Theoretical analysis
2.1 The model structure
We analyze a contracting problem between a risk-neutral principal and a
risk-neutral agent in a stochastically repeated environment. However, the
agent is liquidity-constrained. Hence, payments to the agent must always
be non-negative.8 After each production period the agent leaves the ￿rm for
exogenous reasons and the game ends with probability (1 ￿ p). Thus, the
game is repeated next period with probability p. For parsimony, we assume
that there is no discounting. Moreover, we restrict the analysis to simple
contracts with no memory.
In any given production period the agent supplies productive e⁄ort e 2
[0;1]. This e⁄ort generates value v(e) with v0(e) > 0 and v00(e) < 0. The
agent￿ s e⁄ort can be thought of as an internal service. Hence, e⁄ort itself, e,
and its contribution to ￿rm value, v(e), are non-veri￿able by a third party.
Consequently, they are not explicitly contractible. The agent￿ s private costs
of e⁄ort are given by c(e) = e2 and her outside option is set equal to zero.
To guarantee an interior solution for the ￿rm￿ s overall optimization problem,
we impose the additional requirement that v0(1) < 2.9
The principal is assumed to observe the agent￿ s e⁄ort e.10 Moreover,
there is a monitoring technology generating a veri￿able binary signal s with
s 2 f0;1g. For parsimony, we let Pr[s = 1je] = e ￿hence, we measure
e⁄ort in terms of the probability to observe the favorable signal. Due to the
repeated nature of the game, the principal can use both implicit and explicit
incentives in order to align incentives. Speci￿cally, a contract is a triplet,
C = fb;w;Eg, where b denotes a bonus to be paid if the veri￿able signal is
8If the agent were not liquidity constrained, he could simply buy the production pos-
sibility. It is well-known that a moral hazard problem does not arise in this case.
9The assumption guarantees that the ￿rst-best e⁄ort is smaller than 1 which we need
in order to obtain an interior solution. Alternatively, the model can be generalized by
introducing an increasing convex cost of e⁄ort function satisfying lime!1 c(e) = +1:
10Equivalently he can infer e from v(e).
5favorable, s = 1. Further, w denotes a salary that the principal promises to
pay if he observes e⁄ort e ￿ E.
The bonus part of the contract constitutes an explicit agreement that
is court-enforceable. In contrast, the salary is an implicit agreement which
must be self-enforcing. In other words, assuming the agent supplies e⁄ort
e ￿ E, it must be more advantageous for the principal to keep his promise
and pay w rather than to renege. In the case of reneging the principal looses
his credibility. In all future periods, he can then only o⁄er pure explicit
contracts.
The timing of the game is as follows: ￿rst, the principal designs a contract
and makes a take-or-leave-it o⁄er to the agent. Second, the agent either
rejects or accepts the o⁄er. If the agent rejects, the game ends. Third, if the
agent accepts the contract, she supplies e⁄ort. Next nature determines the
realization of the monitoring signal s. Fourth, depending on the realization of
this signal, the agent may receive a bonus. Also, contingent on his observation
of the agent￿ s e⁄ort, the principal either pays w or reneges.
2.2 The pure explicit contract
In this subsection, we analyze the fallback contract where the principal solely
relies on an explicit bonus to implement the agent￿ s e⁄ort. Hence, both the
salary promise w and the threshold E that would trigger the salary payment
are set equal to zero. We apply backward induction.
With such a pure explicit contract, there is no decision in stage four. In
stage three, given a bonus b and initially assuming that the agent participates,





Let CX(e) denote the principal￿ s cost of inducing e⁄ort e using explicit con-




The di⁄erence between the principal￿ s cost of inducing e⁄ort and the
agent￿ s true e⁄ort costs measures the agent￿ s rent, R(e). Accounting for the
agent￿ s quadratic cost function her rent is
R(e) = C
X(e) ￿ c(e) = e
2 . (3)
Since the rent is always non-negative, the agent￿ s participation condition in
stage two is always satis￿ed.
Further, this result illustrates that requiring non-negative payments to
the agent is essential for the analysis. Otherwise a principal wishing to
implement e⁄ort e could demand an ex-ante ￿xed fee of R(e) from the agent.
The agent would only be allowed to participate in production upon paying
this fee. In that case the principal could extract the entire rent from the
agent and implement the ￿rst-best e⁄ort level.
Finally, in stage one the principal determines the optimal contract: he




e v(e) ￿ 2e
2: (4)
The value of ￿X then constitutes the principal￿ s per-period fallback pro￿t if
he were to renege on the implicit contract and, thereby, loose his credibility.
2.3 The general contract
We proceed by analyzing the general contract that may include a salary
promise to set additional implicit e⁄ort incentives. Again, we apply backward
induction.
7Stage four
Suppose the agent has accepted a contract C =fb;w;Eg. In the ￿nal stage,
the principal must determine whether to keep to his salary promise, w, or
renege on his pledge. By reneging the principal saves on paying out w, but
looses the agent￿ s trust for all future periods. Suppose that, with trust, the
principal obtains per-period expected pro￿ts ￿I. Then, the principal looses
￿
￿I ￿ ￿X￿
in every future period by reneging on her promise.
Accounting for the probability (1 ￿ p) that the game ends for exogenous








X) ￿ w ; (5)
where ￿ = p=(1 ￿ p). In the remaining, W = ￿(￿I ￿ ￿X) denotes the
maximum credible salary promise.
Stage three
At stage three of the game, the agent must decide among three alternatives:
1. If w is not credible, the agent will anticipate the principal￿ s behavior
and her expected income is equal to the expected bonus. As a result,
she only supplies e⁄ort e = eb equating her marginal revenue to her
marginal cost of e⁄ort.
2. If w is credible and E ￿ eb, the agent￿ s expected revenue function
entails an upward step of value w upon reaching some e⁄ort level e ￿ eb.
Thus, the agent again supplies e⁄ort eb and takes the additional salary,
w, as a windfall gain.
3. If w is credible and E > eb, the agent can gain the additional salary
w only if supplying an e⁄ort level e > eb. Thus, there are two possible
cases:
8(a) if
w + Eb ￿ c(E) ￿ e
bb ￿ c(e
b) (6)
the agent supplies e⁄ort e = E.
(b) If (6) is not satis￿ed, the agent again chooses the e⁄ort level e = eb
and foregoes the promised salary.
Stage two
A rational agent anticipates that she will always supply either e = E or
e = eb. Due to (6), her rent is greater or equal to R(eb) ￿ 0. Thus, she
always decides to participate in stage two.
Stage one
To solve the ￿rst stage of the game, we proceed as in the preceding section:
￿rst, we derive the principal￿ s minimum cost function of inducing some e⁄ort
level e given the maximum credible salary W, hereafter CI(e;W). Next, we
use CI(e;W) to solve for the optimal contract.
The minimum cost function CI(e;W)
Suppose the principal wants to implement e⁄ort e. From the foregoing, we
know there are two relevant cases. First, consider the case e = eb. Antici-
pating the agent￿ s response in stage three, the principal should obviously set
w = E = 0. Consequently, the contract is a pure explicit agreement and the
principal￿ s cost for implementing e is CX(e) = 2e2.
Alternatively, suppose the principal sets e = E > eb. For ease of notation,
















w ￿ W (CC)
Equation (IC1) implicitly de￿nes eb. Condition (IC2) states that the agent
would be better of by supplying e rather than eb. Finally, (CC) guarantees
that the contract is credible.
First, consider situations where W ￿ c(e). In that case, the principal can
set w = c(e), b = 0, and E = e. He would then induce costs CI(e;W) =
c(e). Clearly, the principal cannot do better without violating the agent￿ s
participation constraint. Since b = 0 implies eb = 0, constraint (IC2) is
binding in the optimization problem (I) above.
Next, consider the case W < c(e). Suppose that (IC2) were not binding
at the cost minimum. In this case, a marginal reduction in b would reduce eb,
thereby decreasing the right hand side of (IC2) without violating any of the
constraints. However a reduction in b then also lowers the principal￿ s cost.
Hence, (IC2) must again be binding given a cost-minimizing contract.








) w = (e ￿ e
b)
2. (7)
Recalling that e > eb, yields
e
b = e ￿
p
w. (8)
Consequently, to minimize costs the principal should set the bonus as low as
possible while adjusting salary. For the case W < c(e), it must therefore be
10true that w = W implying11
C







Rearranging terms, we can ￿nally rewrite the principal￿ s minimum cost func-










Expression (10) helps to clarify the source of the cost saving potential
associated with the salary promise as an additional implicit e⁄ort incentive.
At one extreme with W = 0, observe that CI(e;0) = CX(e) = 2e2. At the
other extreme where W ￿ c(e), it follows that CI(e;W) = c(e) = e2. Then,
consider intermediary values of W with 0 < W < c(e). Within this range,
CI
W(e;W) = 1 ￿ e=
p
W < 0 since W < c(e) = e2.
Intuitively, a higher maximum credible salary W allows the principal
to increase his salary promise w and to lower the explicit bonus b. The
latter always reduces the agent￿ s rent associated with the implied value of eb.
However, this potential to reduce costs is limited by the credibility constraint
(CC). Consequently, w = W in the cost minimum.
Expected pro￿t maximization
In the foregoing, we considered W to be exogenously given. In fact, it is en-
dogenously determined by (5) which compares present value loss from cheat-












Consider the case where the self-enforcement constraint (SC) is not bind-
ing. Accordingly, taking the derivative with respect to W yields CI
W(e;W) =







110 which, from above, necessarily implies W ￿ c(eI),where superscript ￿I￿de-
note optimal values. From the foregoing, we know that with W ￿ c(eI) the
principal o⁄ers a pure implicit contract, i.e. a contract containing only a
salary promise wI = c(eI) and no explicit bonus, bI = 0. The optimal e⁄ort
eI must then be ￿rst-best. Hence, eI = e￿ where e￿ satis￿es v0(e￿) = c0(e￿).
However, if the maximum credible salary promise W is smaller than c(e￿),
the self-enforcement constraint (SC) must be binding. In the remaining, we
focus on this second case. It then follows that CI(e;W) is given by (10)
above. Since w = W we can further simplify the notation to obtain the
Lagrangian



































I = 0: (13)




> 0. Given (10), condi-
tion (12) then immediately reveals that the optimal e⁄ort level is second-best.
Speci￿cally, eI ￿ e￿ with equality if, and only if, ￿I = 0.
2.4 Properties of the optimal contract
Given the case where the self-enforcement constraint (SC) is binding and
using (10) from above, the solution (eI;wI) is implicitly de￿ned by the system
of equations









￿ wI = 0
(14)



















































since ￿I ￿ 0. Let ￿I denote the determinant of the matrix in (15). Clearly,
























Denoting the expected bonus with BI = eIbI = 2eI(eI￿
p
wI), we can further


































upon substituting the respective partials, rearranging terms, and some sim-
pli￿cation. Finally, since the expected bonus decreases while the probability
of receiving the bonus increases, we can easily infer that bI must also be
decreasing in ￿.
Altogether, we can characterize the optimal contract as follows:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the principal is constrained in making cred-
ible promises concerning future salaries. Then, the optimal contract CI=
￿
bI;wI;EI￿
is a function of the probability p that the principal-agent rela-
tionship does not terminate prematurely. Speci￿cally:
(a) An increase in p increases the salary promise wI and the threshold
e⁄ort level EI that triggers the payment of this salary.
(b) Since this threshold level EI is equal to the actual e⁄ort eI of the
agent, productivity v(eI) also increases with higher probability p.
13(c) However, the explicit bonus bI that is paid out contingent on realizing
a favorable monitoring signal as well as the expected bonus BI decrease with
higher p.
The proposition yields a number of testable hypotheses with regard to the
productivity e⁄ects of implicit salary promises and explicit bonus incentives
as well as the trade-o⁄between these two incentive devices. In the remaining,
we use case study data to evaluate the theoretical analysis.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 The data
To test the model we can draw on personnel data covering the German satel-
lite o¢ ces of a large, globally operating insurance company. In 2003 there are
83 satellite o¢ ces (2004: 84, 2005: 80, 2006: 79 and 2007: 76). We can track
employees from January 2003 until December 2007. The dataset comprises
1123 employee-year observations for 317 individuals.
Employment is highest (lowest) in 2003 (2007) providing 237 (209) annual
records. Table 1 exhibits the numbers of employees leaving the ￿rm in each
year as well as during the complete observation period. These individuals are
those who quit for reasons other than retirement. We also exclude employees
who exit the satellite o¢ ces due to career moves within the ￿rm.
Insert Table 1 about here
223 of those 237 individuals who are employed in the initial year 2003
do not retire and are not promoted during the observation period. Yet,
79 of these 223 employees quit the ￿rm for personal reasons over this ￿ve-
year period. For our econometric analysis we focus on this group of 223
individuals since retirement and promotion issues do not ￿t our theoretical
14analysis. Table 2 reports separate descriptive statistics for all employees and
for our focus-group of 223 individuals. The respective entries do not indicate
a selection problem.
Employees are between 24 and 64 years old and mostly male (92%). The
average age is 39 years. We construct a variable measuring the years of formal
education ranging from 9 to 18 years.12 The mean of education is 11:8 years.
Further, mean (maximum) company tenure is 12:7 (39) years. Using postal
code information, we further measure the distance between the employee￿ s
home and her o¢ ce. A substantial part of the employees works in the same
town in which the satellite o¢ ce is located (28:9%). The mean distance
(home_work) is 25 km. Also, the mean distance between the company￿ s
head quarter and the satellite o¢ ces (dist_hq) is 361:6 km.13
Insert Table 2 about here
We further use the German Statistical O¢ ce￿ s dataset14 on the regional
income tax distribution in 2001 to proxy local labor market and insurance
demand conditions. The lowest annual tax per taxpayer (tax) is recorded in
the district of Chemnitz in Saxony (e 2;847), the highest value is found in
the district of Darmstadt in Hessia (e 8;770). Although, German uni￿cation
already took place in 1990, unemployment ratios are still signi￿cantly higher
and wages signi￿cantly lower in former East Germany. Thus, we introduce
a dummy variable to identify whether the employee lives in former West
Germany or Berlin (west_or_berlin).
12Speci￿cally, a university degree is taken to require 18 years of studying (includ-
ing schooling), a degree from a university of applied sciences (￿Fachhochschule￿ ) 16
years, the university-preparatory school degree (￿Abitur￿ ) 13 years, the subject-restricted
university-preparatory school degree (￿Fachochschulreife￿ ) 12 years, the degree of a com-
mercial college (￿H￿here Handelsschule￿ ) 11 years, the secondary modern school degree
(￿Realschule￿ ) 10 years, and the standard secondary school degree (￿Volksschule￿ and
￿Hauptschule￿ ) 9 years.
13To protect the company￿ s anonymity we do not report the maximum distance in this
case.
14Federal Statistical O¢ ce (2008).
15The employees in our data set coordinate the insurer￿ s exclusive agents in
their regional areas and lines of business. Speci￿cally, they do not sell insur-
ance themselves. The company distinguishes between three business lines:
life insurance, property and casualty insurance (p_c), and health insurance.
In total, the sales agents controlled by our employees collect commissions
worth e 654 millions. The variable production used in the ensuing analy-
sis sums all commissions that are paid out to an employee￿ s subordinate
sales personnel for new policies underwritten in a given year. It ranges from
e 50;184 to e 1;994;893 with an average of e 605;077. Mean production
actually decreases from 2003 to 2004 and 2004 to 2005 and increases in the
two remaining years.
Average employee earnings (total_income) are steadily increasing dur-
ing our observation period, though at varying rates.15 Over all years it is
equal to e 45;069 on average with minimum and maximum incomes at e
26;145 and e 73;755. Roughly half (57%) of the employees￿income is ￿xed
(￿xed_salary). The remaining part (43%) is performance pay (variable_pay)
that is triggered by reaching production targets.
3.2 The econometric strategy
The econometric approach has to cope with a number of di¢ culties arising
both from the nature of the data and the possible endogeneity of variables. In
particular, the results summarized in Proposition 1 above are obtained from
comparative static analysis and further insertions. Consequently, regressions
to identify the determinants of ￿xed income, variable pay, and individual
productivity are likely to be linked by their disturbances.
Thus, estimating the three functional relationships in Proposition 1 a) - c)
necessitates the use of a simultaneous equations model (SEM). Speci￿cally,
15Throughout we adjust for in￿ ation, of course.
16we choose the following basic SEM-structure:




1(total_income) + X￿1 + "1




2(total_income) + X￿2 + "2
production = ￿3 + ￿
S
3(survival) + Z￿3 + "3
total_income = ￿xed_salary + variable_pay (20)
where survival constitutes our proxy of the expected duration ￿ of the con-
tract. We provide a detailed description of how we obtained this proxy below.
Clearly, "i, i = 1;2;3, denotes the respective error term. Finally, X and Z
denote matrices of independent variables to control for other individual, job-
speci￿c, and market e⁄ects on income and productivity.
To estimate our model we must identify variables that on the one hand
e⁄ect productivity and on the other hand do not impact an employee￿ s com-
pensation and vice versa. Regarding the former, we clearly expect that com-
missions and, hence, our productivity measure di⁄ers between the lines of
business (life, p_c, health). However, job-competition within the ￿rm pre-
cludes that such di⁄erences a⁄ect income opportunities.
In contrast, distance from ￿rm￿ s headquarters (dist_hq) should exhibit
only income e⁄ects. Speci￿cally, a possible lack of promotion opportunities
within the ￿rm￿ s main administration should be compensated. Also, gender
e⁄ects on pay are well-documented. Thus, we include male only in the equa-
tions for ￿xed and variable pay. We can then test whether these two sets of
variables - i. e. life, p_c, and health vis-￿-vis dist_hq and male - are actually
exogenous.
While the ￿rst three lines in (20) correspond to parts a), b), and c)
of Proposition 1, the last line merely re￿ ects the pay accounting identity.
Note that we use the same set of explanatory variables in both income equa-
tions. Hence, we could have eliminated this identity thereby reducing both
the number of equations and the number of endogenous variables. How-
ever, estimating the complete structure (20) yields more easily interpretable
results.16 Finally, accounting for between-equation correlation of the error
16In this respect note that, according to Zellner and Theil (1962, p. 68) and Greene
17terms, we estimate (20) using Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS).
3.3 Expected contract duration
From our theoretical model the expected contract duration ￿ (that is com-
puted using the exogenous probability p of premature contract termina-
tion) determines the optimal balance between implicit and explicit incen-
tives. Clearly, our model assumes that the parties have rational expectations
concerning this variable. Maintaining this assumption, we therefore use the
information on quits to obtain a proxy of ￿.
Generally, we cannot integrate duration estimates into our simultaneous
equations model (20) above. Instead we must obtain an independent estimate
for the group of 223 employees who were employed in 2003 already and are
not retired or promoted during the observation period.17 In a ￿rst step,
Figure 1 then displays non-parametric estimates of the hazard and survival
functions. They are clearly non-monotonic. For this case, Kalb￿ eisch and
Prentice (1980) suggest to ￿t either a log-normal or a log-logistic duration
model.
Insert Figure 1 about here
We use only two individual-speci￿c covariates: the distance between the
employee￿ s home and her o¢ ce (home_work) and the employee￿ s corporate
tenure in 2003 as percent of her potential tenure years. The latter is calcu-
lated as tenure divided by age minus education. This transformation re￿ ects
that - in contrast to productivity studies where ￿raw￿tenure is often used
to capture experience e⁄ects - our approach requires to identify a predictor
for the individual￿ s future quit behavior.18
Goodness-of-￿t can be assessed by calculating the Akaike Information
(2003, p. 390), such identitities do not a⁄ect the identi￿cation problem.
17See e. g. Theodossiou and White (1998) for a similar approach.
18Also, the inclusion of other individual charcteristics as explanatory variables does not
improve the overall quality of the estimate.
18Criterion (AIC). This measure selects the model that explains the data best
with a minimum of free parameters. Given our application, the value of the
AIC-test for the log-normal model estimate is 236:37 compared to 239:10 for
the log-logistic model. Thus, we proceed by using the log-normal estimate.19
Table 3 reports the respective results in the so-called ￿accelerated failure
time form￿ . Hence, positive coe¢ cients imply a deceleration of time.20 Note
that the joint restrictions are signi￿cant at the 1%-level.
Insert Table 3 and Figure 2 about here
Figure 2 depicts the corresponding hazard function. The scaling parame-
ter - denoted ￿ in Table 3 - determines the skewness of this function. It is
highly signi￿cant; the respective z-statistic (not reported) is equal to 3:53.
For our subsequent analyses, we then calculate the variable survival as the
median predicted survival time for each individual. It serves as a proxy for
the expected contract duration.
3.4 Productivity and income structure
Tables 4.a and b report the ￿nal and ￿rst stage estimations of the system
(20) above. Recall that our survival time estimate focuses on the year 2003.
Thus, the ￿rst sets of three equations in these tables uses only the income and
productivity data for 2003. However, we also use the 2003 survival estimates
to calculate the predicted mean survival times for the four subsequent years
2004 - 2007.21 The second set of equations Tables 4.a and b thus draws on
19However, we also ￿t a number of other duration models to the data. Yet, the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) still prefers the log-normal duation model: the AIC of the
Weibull model is 240:34, 238:37 for the exponential and 237:97 for the Gompertz models.
The log-normal duration model also has the highest log-likelihood. We further use the
semi-parametric Cox Proportional Hazard model that does not require speci￿c distribu-
tional assumptions. The respective estimates are very similar to those reported in Table
3.
20See Martinussen and Scheike (2006).
21Using a probit model on the full sample of employees, we have checked that these
expected survival times constitute very good predictors of the actual quit behavior.
19the full set of 878 observations for the group of 223 individuals who are not
retired or promoted during the observation period.22
Insert Tables 4.a and 4.b about here
Overall signi￿cance is very solid for both estimates: lacking the possibility
to report R2-values for the ￿nal stage, the corresponding ￿2-tests reject the
hypothesis that all coe¢ cients are equal zero. Also, the respective F-tests
do not indicate a weak instrument problem. We follow Wooldridge (2002)
in using a version of the Hausman-test to investigate whether the overiden-
ti￿cation restrictions are valid. For one additional instrument the critical
value of the over-identi￿cation test is 2:70. Hence, we cannot reject the null-
hypothesis that excluded variables are exogenous for any of our equations.
Focussing on the key variable survival, the symmetry of the coe¢ cients for
￿xed salaries and variable pay in the ￿nal stage directly follows from explicitly
including the total_income identity. However, note that, even given this
constraint, the ￿nal stage regression could still yield three di⁄erent scenarios:
survival could in principle either increase variable pay at the expense of
￿xed_salary, decrease variable pay while increasing ￿xed_salary, or show no
e⁄ect on the income structure at all. Only the second of these scenarios is
consistent with our theory, though.
The results reported in Table 4.a then strongly support all three parts
of the Proposition 1. Moreover, it does not matter whether we limit the
estimation to the year 2003 or consider the full observation period 2003 -
2007. Although the results are somewhat stronger using the larger sample,23
both approaches con￿rm that longer expected durations of contracts increase
￿xed salaries at the expense of reducing variable pay. At the same time,
22Thus, there are 223 individuals in 2003 of which 190 (167, 154, 144) remain employed
in the same function in 2004 (2005, 2006, 2007).
23Apart from the statistical e⁄ects of increasing the number of observations, an income
promise which in theory would be realized ￿in the next period￿can in practise well be
delivered over a number of subsequent years.
20individual productivity increases with longer expected contract duration.
Insert Table 5 about here
Using an SEM-approach further allows for an interesting experiment:
with the same ￿rst-stage regression reported in Table 4.b already, Table 5
contains the ￿nal stage estimates of an alternative system of equations ob-
tained by replacing survival by variable_pay and ￿xed_salary as determi-
nants of productivity. Speci￿cally, we now estimate the system




1(total_income) + X￿1 + "1




2(total_income) + X￿2 + "2
production = ￿3 + ￿
F
3 (￿xed_salary) + ￿
V
3 (variable_pay) + Z￿3 + "3
total_income = ￿xed_salary + variable_pay (21)
Recall that the system (20) yields a coe¢ cient-value of 906:48 for survival
(in the sixth column of Table 4.a). The respective standard error is 329:73.










2 = ￿15:43 ￿ 20:55 + 25:77 ￿ 47:24
= 904:93 . (22)
Hence, using a standard t-test, the hypothesis that ￿
S
3 as derived from (20) is








2 obtained when estimating (21) must
be rejected. In other words, the importance of survival to explain production
appears to be entirely captured by e⁄ect of survival on the contractual pay
scheme.
Finally, we regress survival on the residuals of the production-equation
obtained when estimating system (21). The coe¢ cient value is ￿1:33 with
standard error 294. The respective t-statistic is equal to zero. Hence, the
income structure rather appears to re￿ ect expectations of future contractual
compliance than e⁄ects that stem from current productivity.
213.5 Robustness of results
The ￿nal stage estimates in Tables 4.a and 5 are derived using the Three Stage
Least Squares (3SLS) method. This model uses the information contained
in the covariance matrix via Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimation.
Thus, 3SLS incorporates all information contained in the system of equa-
tions to estimate all parameters in each individual equation. In contrast,
Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) only draws on the information in the spe-
ci￿c individual equation to estimate the parameters from the corresponding
equation. While 3SLS is therefore more e¢ cient, it bears the risk that a
speci￿cation error in one equation will be transmitted to all other equations.
Consequently, we also use 2SLS to estimate the models above. Compared
with the results in Tables 4.a. and 5, the respective di⁄erences are minimal,
however.
Since we know the number of sales agents controlled by each of the man-
agers in our data set, we can also calculate management performance as
production per agent. Obviously, using this variable to replace production as
a productivity measure in (20), the coe¢ cient values for survival change. Yet,
there is no di⁄erence in their signs and signi￿cance levels. Further, we esti-
mate model versions in which survival in year t is taken to a⁄ect ￿xed_salary
in year t+1. Clearly, the respective coe¢ cients in the two income equations
then cease to be mirror-images of each other. However, signs and signi￿cance
levels are again not a⁄ected.
Finally, we can improve the overall explanatory power of our model by
distinguishing di⁄erent sets of explanatory variables for ￿xed_salary and
variable_pay. Yet, in this case the equality of coe¢ cients on survival between
our two model versions (20) and (21) above cannot be checked as easily. To
save space, we therefore decide not report any of the above extensions and
variations of our basic model. However, they are available upon request.
224 Conclusions
We derive the optimal contract between a principal and a liquidity-constrained
agent in a stochastically repeated environment characterized by moral haz-
ard. The contract comprises two parts; a court-enforceable explicit bonus
rule based on a veri￿able signal and an implicit salary promise conditioned
on the observable, but not veri￿able agent￿ s e⁄ort. Hence, the latter promise
must be self-enforcing. We ￿nd that the agent￿ s rent increases with bonus
pay. Thus, the principal implements the maximum credible salary promise.
We then show that the bonus increases while the salary promise and the
agent￿ s e⁄ort decrease with a higher probability of premature contract ter-
mination.
We subject the mechanism of our model to an econometric investigation
that draws on personnel data of a large German insurance company. Using
a hazard rate model, we ￿rst obtain estimates of the employees￿expected
survival within the ￿rm based on individual characteristics. These estimates
enter into a simultaneous equations system that, under the assumptions of
our model, identi￿es the determinants of ￿xed salary, variable pay, and pro-
ductivity. The results strongly support our theoretical predictions: the inter-
play between ￿xed and variable pay is determined by the expected contract
duration. Moreover, this incentive mechanism drives productivity. Thus,
employers capture e¢ ciency gains by replacing bonuses with salary promises
for employees who are characterized by higher probabilities to stay with the
￿rm.
The results of our analysis can also be interpreted in light of the ongoing
discussion of environmental risk and contract design. Intuitively, a higher
probability of premature contract termination re￿ ects more uncertainty in
the employment relationship. According to our ￿ndings, we should observe
a reduction in salaries and e⁄ort together with an increase in bonus pay; yet
without contradiction to standard incentive theory.
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Figure 2: Hazard Function Estimates (Log-Normal Regression)
28Table 1: Employees leaving the company  
Year
Employees 




Employees leaving until 2007 
(excluding retirees)
2003 237 8 31
2004 234 12 28
2005 229 13 19
2006 214 15 11





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Standard errors in parentheses; *significant at  10%; * *significant at  5%; 
*** significant at 1%.
survival time











time at risk 1226.000
N failures 31
Note: ln(σ) →σ =1.739



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2581 António Afonso and Christophe Rault, Bootstrap Panel Granger-Causality between 
Government Budget and External Deficits for the EU, March 2009 
 
2582 Bernd Süssmuth, Malte Heyne and Wolfgang Maennig, Induced Civic Pride and 
Integration, March 2009 
 
2583 Martin Peitz and Markus Reisinger, Indirect Taxation in Vertical Oligopoly, March 
2009 
 
2584 Petra M. Geraats, Trends in Monetary Policy Transparency, March 2009 
 
2585 Johannes Abeler, Armin Falk, Lorenz Götte and David Huffman, Reference Points and 
Effort Provision, March 2009 
 
2586 Wolfram F. Richter, Taxing Education in Ramsey’s Tradition, March 2009 
 
2587 Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn and Eiji Fujii, China’s Current Account and 
Exchange Rate, March 2009 
 
2588 Alexander Haupt and Silke Uebelmesser, Voting on Labour-Market Integration and 
Education Policy when Citizens Differ in Mobility and Ability, March 2009 
 
2589 Hans Jarle Kind, Marko Koethenbuerger and Guttorm Schjelderup, Should Utility-
Reducing Media Advertising be Taxed?, March 2009 
 
2590 Alessandro Cigno, How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System 
Design, March 2009 
 
2591 Helmut Lütkepohl and Fang Xu, The Role of the Log Transformation in Forecasting 
Economic Variables, March 2009 
 
2592 Rainald Borck, Hyun-Ju Koh and Michael Pflüger, Inefficient Lock-in and Subsidy 
Competition, March 2009 
 
2593 Paolo M. Panteghini, On the Equivalence between Labor and Consumption Taxation, 
March 2009 
 
2594 Bruno S. Frey, Economists in the PITS?, March 2009 
 
2595 Natalie Chen and Dennis Novy, International Trade Integration: A Disaggregated 
Approach, March 2009 
 
2596 Frédérique Bec and Christian Gollier, Term Structure and Cyclicity of Value-at-Risk: 
Consequences for the Solvency Capital Requirement, March 2009 
  
2597 Carsten Eckel, International Trade and Retailing, March 2009 
 
2598 Gianni De Nicolò and Iryna Ivaschenko, Global Liquidity, Risk Premiums and Growth 
Opportunities, March 2009 
 
2599 Jay Pil Choi and Heiko Gerlach, International Antitrust Enforcement and Multi-Market 
Contact, March 2009 
 
2600 Massimo Bordignon and Guido Tabellini, Moderating Political Extremism: Single 
Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule, April 2009 
 
2601 Ana B. Ania and Andreas Wagener, The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an 
Evolutionary Learning Process, April 2009 
 
2602 Simon Gächter, Daniele Nosenzo, Elke Renner and Martin Sefton, Sequential versus 
Simultaneous Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence, April 2009 
 
2603 Philippe Jehiel and Andrew Lilico, Smoking Today and Stopping Tomorrow: A Limited 
Foresight Perspective, April 2009 
 
2604 Andreas Knabe, Steffen Rätzel, Ronnie Schöb and Joachim Weimann, Dissatisfied with 
Life, but Having a Good Day: Time-Use and Well-Being of the Unemployed, April 
2009 
 
2605 David Bartolini and Raffaella Santolini, Fiscal Rules and the Opportunistic Behaviour 
of the Incumbent Politician: Evidence from Italian Municipalities, April 2009 
 
2606 Erkki Koskela and Jan König, Can Profit Sharing Lower Flexible Outsourcing? A Note, 
April 2009 
 
2607 Michel Beine, Frédéric Docquier and Çağlar Özden, Diasporas, April 2009 
 
2608 Gerd Ronning and Hans Schneeweiss, Panel Regression with Random Noise, April 
2009 
 
2609 Adam S. Booij, Bernard M.S. van Praag and Gijs van de Kuilen, A Parametric Analysis 
of Prospect Theory’s Functionals for the General Population, April 2009 
 
2610 Jeffrey R. Brown, Julia Lynn Coronado and Don Fullerton, Is Social Security Part of the 
Social Safety Net?, April 2009 
 
2611 Ali Bayar and Bram Smeets, Economic, Political and Institutional Determinants of 
Budget Deficits in the European Union, April 2009 
 
2612 Balázs Égert, The Impact of Monetary and Commodity Fundamentals, Macro News and 
Central Bank Communication on the Exchange Rate: Evidence from South Africa, April 
2009 
 
2613 Michael Melvin, Christian Saborowski, Michael Sager and Mark P. Taylor, Bank of 
England Interest Rate Announcements and the Foreign Exchange Market, April 2009  
2614 Marie-Louise Leroux, Pierre Pestieau and Gregory Ponthiere, Should we Subsidize 
Longevity?, April 2009 
 
2615 Ronald MacDonald, Lukas Menkhoff and Rafael R. Rebitzky, Exchange Rate 
Forecasters’ Performance: Evidence of Skill?, April 2009 
 
2616 Frederick van der Ploeg and Steven Poelhekke, The Volatility Curse: Revisiting the 
Paradox of Plenty, April 2009 
 
2617 Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp, Hannes Öhler and Johannes Weisser, Acting 
Autonomously or Mimicking the State and Peers? A Panel Tobit Analysis of Financial 
Dependence and Aid Allocation by Swiss NGOs, April 2009 
 
2618 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Roman Matousek and Chris Stewart, Rating Assignments: 
Lessons from International Banks, April 2009 
 
2619 Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz, Asymmetric Information and Overinvestment in 
Quality, April 2009 
 
2620 Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk, David Huffman and Uwe Sunde, Are Risk Aversion and 
Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability?, April 2009 
 
2621 Yin-Wong Cheung and Xingwang Qian, The Empirics of China’s Outward Direct 
Investment, April 2009 
 
2622 Frédérique Bec and Christian Gollier, Assets Returns Volatility and Investment 
Horizon: The French Case, April 2009 
 
2623 Ronnie Schöb and Marcel Thum, Asymmetric Information Renders Minimum Wages 
Less Harmful, April 2009 
 
2624 Martin Ruf and Alfons J. Weichenrieder, The Taxation of Passive Foreign Investment – 
Lessons from German Experience, April 2009 
 
2625 Yao Li, Borders and Distance in Knowledge Spillovers: Dying over Time or Dying with 
Age? – Evidence from Patent Citations, April 2009 
 
2626 Jim Malley and Ulrich Woitek, Technology Shocks and Aggregate Fluctuations in an 
Estimated Hybrid RBC Model, April 2009 
 
2627 Jin Cao and Gerhard Illing, Endogenous Systemic Liquidity Risk, April 2009 
 
2628 Thiess Buettner and Bjoern Kauder, Revenue Forecasting Practices: Differences across 
Countries and Consequences for Forecasting Performance, April 2009 
 
2629 Håkan Selin, The Rise in Female Employment and the Role of Tax Incentives – An 
Empirical Analysis of the Swedish Individual Tax Reform of 1971, April 2009 
 
2630 Nick Johnstone and Ivan Hascic, Environmental Policy Design and the Fragmentation 
of International Markets for Innovation, April 2009  
2631 Spiros Bougheas, Richard Kneller and Raymond Riezman, Optimal Education Policies 
and Comparative Advantage, April 2009 
 
2632 Jay Pil Choi and Heiko Gerlach, Multi-Market Collusion with Demand Linkages and 
Antitrust Enforcement, April 2009 
 
2633 Thor O. Thoresen, Income Mobility of Owners of Small Businesses when Boundaries 
between Occupations are Vague, April 2009 
 
2634 Guido Schwerdt and Amelie C. Wuppermann, Is Traditional Teaching really all that 
Bad? A Within-Student Between-Subject Approach, April 2009 
 
2635 Kurt R. Brekke, Luigi Siciliani and Odd Rune Straume, Hospital Competition and 
Quality with Regulated Prices, April 2009 
 
2636 Peter Diamond, Taxes and Pensions, April 2009 
 
2637 Shoshana Grossbard, How “Chicagoan” are Gary Becker’s Economic Models of 
Marriage?, May 2009 
 
2638 Roland Strausz, Regulatory Risk under Optimal Incentive Regulation, May 2009 
 
2639 Holger Zemanek, Ansgar Belke and Gunther Schnabl, Current Account Imbalances and 
Structural Adjustment in the Euro Area: How to Rebalance Competitiveness, May 2009 
 
2640 Harald Hau and Marcel Thum, Subprime Crisis and Board (In-)Competence: Private vs. 
Public Banks in Germany, May 2009 
 
2641 Martin Halla, Mario Lackner and Friedrich G. Schneider, An Empirical Analysis of the 
Dynamics of the Welfare State: The Case of Benefit Morale, May 2009 
 
2642 Balázs Égert, Infrastructure Investment in Network Industries: The Role of Incentive 
Regulation and Regulatory Independence, May 2009 
 
2643 Christian Gollier, Expected Net Present Value, Expected Net Future Value, and the 
Ramsey Rule, May 2009 
 
2644 Sören Blomquist and Håkan Selin, Hourly Wage Rate and Taxable Labor Income 
Responsiveness to Changes in Marginal Tax Rates, May 2009 
 
2645 Dominique Demougin, Oliver Fabel and Christian Thomann, Implicit vs. Explicit 
Incentives: Theory and a Case Study, May 2009 